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Abstract—With the increasing growth of cyber-attack incidences, it is important to develop innovative and effective techniques to
assess and defend networked systems against cyber attacks. One of the well-known techniques for this is performing penetration
testing which is carried by a group of security professionals (i.e, red team). Penetration testing is also known to be effective to find
existing and new vulnerabilities, however, the quality of security assessment can be depending on the quality of the red team members
and their time and devotion to the penetration testing. In this paper, we propose a novel automation framework for cyber-attacks
generation and defense enforcement named ‘HARMer’. Our novel proposed framework, design and implementation is based on
scalable graphical security model called Hierarchical Attack Representation Model (HARM). (1) We propose the requirements and the
key phases for the automation framework. (2) We propose security metrics-based attack planning strategies along with their
algorithms. (3) We conduct experiments in a real enterprise network and Amazon Web Services. The results show how the different
phases of the framework interact to model the attackers’ operations. This framework will allow security administrators to automatically
assess the impact of various threats, attacks and their defense in an automated manner.
Index Terms—Attack Automation, Attack Planning, Blue Team, Cybersecurity, Defense Automation, Offensive Security, Penetration
Testing, Red Team
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1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the billions of dollars spent on the prevention
of cyber-attacks, cyber-criminals have continued to cause
devastating financial losses to businesses, enterprises, the
governments, etc. In 2018, the CSIS (Center for Strategic
and International Studies) in partnership with McAfee has
estimated the worldwide costs of cyber-attacks at about
$600 billion and it is predicted to cost the world $6 trillion
annually by 2021 [1]. Therefore, there is a need for more
innovative techniques to assess and defend networked sys-
tems against cyber-attacks.
Offensive security testing techniques have been em-
ployed to assess the various security posture of networks
by launching cyber attacks. Some of these testing techniques
include: 1) the traditional penetration testing - where the
testing focuses on identifying and exploiting the system and
network vulnerabilities [2], and 2) the red teaming (RT) -
which assesses a network resilience against cyber-attack by
emulating real cyber attackers [3]. The RT moves beyond the
penetration testing by imitating real steps that an attacker
would necessarily take. However, conducting the red team
exercise is a manual process and hence, the quality of
security assessment can be depending on the quality of the
red team members and their time and devotion to the test
exercise.
On the other hand, automating the activities of the real
attackers is faced with a great challenge of deciding the
attacker’s course of actions. Tools such as Attack Graphs
(AG) [4] have been used to represent possible sequences of
actions that attackers may take to achieve the attack goal,
but the AG focuses on analyzing the network vulnerabilities
and producing a set of attack paths with no indication
of the attacker’s specific attack plan. Moreover, with the
increasing size of modern networks, the AG has exponen-
tial complexity and thus causing scalability problem [5].
Similarly, the Attack Trees (ATs) [6] represents attacks as
a tree with leaf nodes and child nodes, where leaf nodes
show different ways of achieving the goal, and child nodes
represent attack steps. However, the ATs does not explicitly
reflect the sequences of attack path nor specify a workable
attacker’s attack plan.
Hong and Kim [7], [8] addressed the scalability problem of
AG by developing hierarchical models that combine (and
separate the functionality of) the AGs and ATs unto two or
more number of hierarchical layers (this model is named Hi-
erarchical Attack Representation Models (HARM)). A two-
layer HARM mainly compromises of two layers: the upper
layer which captures the network reachability information
(using an AG that models only the reachability information)
and the lower layer that captures the vulnerability informa-
tion of each node in the network (using ATs).
Although the HARM has been used to generate the set of
possible attack paths (similar to the AGs) to reach a target
node, it has not been used to plan a rational attacker’s
possible attack action. Hence, more work is needed to
strategically plan the attacker’s and the defender’s possible
actions in the network. Since the HARM is more scalable
and adaptable compared to the AGs and ATs, we utilize its
functionality to achieve this goal. Specifically, we develop a
deterministic planning strategy (named metrics-based plan-
ning) with the HARM to systematically plan attacks for
automated adversary actions. Moreover, we propose a novel
framework named HARMer to automate the modeling and
execution of cyber-attacks, threats detection and defenses.
We carry out experiments in real network and Amazon Web
Services (AWS) to demonstrate and validate the framework.
The proposed framework will provide a way to automat-
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2ically perform security analysis and evaluation of a real
system by performing a red team and blue team operations.
The major goals of this paper are summarized as follows.
• Develop a requirement specification for building au-
tomating cyber-attacks.
• Propose a framework for automating and assessing
cyber-attacks and defense activities.
• Develop an automated attack planner using a Graph-
ical Security Model (GSM).
• Demonstrate the framework using a case study net-
work and experiments on the AWS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives summary of the related work. Section 3 dis-
cusses methodology, requirement analysis and the automa-
tion framework. Section 4 describes the proposed attack
planning strategies. Section 5 presents the illustration of
the attack and defense framework using a case study. In
Section 6, we presents our experiments and results based
on Amazon’s AWS using two network models. Section 7
discusses our results, limitations and future work. Lastly,
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We discuss the state-of-the art work on automating cyber-
attacks and defenses.
2.1 Security Model Automation for Red Team and Blue
Team
There are a lot of works which addressed the problem of
assessing the security of network systems using different
types of automation approaches. We discuss the related
work in two aspects: security models, and attack & defense
framework.
Security Models: One of the popular used of automa-
tion for the red team activities is the use of AGs. The
AG provides away for the red team to generate possible
sequences of attack steps to gain access to a target using
network reachability information and a set of vulnerability.
The work of Phillipsi & Swiler [20] is one of the earlier
work that developed a graph-based tool to assess the risks
to a networked system by identifying the set of attack paths
with a high probability of success or low attack costs for the
attacker. This tool provided a way to test the effectiveness of
defenses (such as intrusion detection systems, firewall rules
changes, etc).
Sheyner et al. [21] presented an automated approach to
generating and analyzing AG based on symbolic model
checking algorithm. Besides, they performed minimization
analysis on the AG to determine the minimal sets of atomic
attacks that must be prevented in order to guarantee that
the attacker cannot reach his goal. Kotenko and Stepashkin
[9] utilized the AGs to simulate and evaluate the attacker’s
actions (based on vulnerabilities). To improve security,
Kotenko and Stepashkin checked the various properties of
the AGs and then used various security metrics to determine
ways to prevent possible attacks.
Wang et al. [10] proposed an AG-based probabilistic
metric to measure the likelihood of sophisticated attacks
combining multiple vulnerabilities to reach the attacker
target. Poolsappasit et al. [11] proposed Bayesian AGs to
quantify the likelihood of a network being compromised
at different levels. Based on the levels information,
Poolsappasit et al. developed security mitigation and
management plan for the network administrator. The
aforementioned AG approaches focused on generating a
set of attack paths to the attack goal with no indication
of a specific attack path that at adversary may use per
time. Hence, it is difficult to use the AGs to automate
the real-world interaction between the attacker and the
defender since no specific plan is shown.
Framework for cyber-attacks and defense: An attack
and defense framework will provide a structure and flow
to combine the analysis and evaluations of cyber-threats
and their related defense mechanisms effectively. However,
most of the state-of-the-art automation framework only
considered the threats or defense models in isolation while
others are theoretical automation frameworks.
Moskal [12] presented a framework for modeling cyber-
attack behaviors for use with existing attack simulators in
order to analyze the effects of single or multiple attackers
on a network. This framework utilizes Cyber Kill Chain
behavior to model an attacker’s decisions while taking into
account what the attacker knows, how the attacker learn
about the network, the vulnerabilities, and targets. Similar
to our work is the extension provided by Moskal et al.
[22], which proposed the red and blue teams simulation
framework to show the interplay between an attacker and
defender. The framework was defined based on the net-
work, the attackers and the intentions, the dependencies
between the attacker and the network including capabilities
and preferences. Furthermore, they showed an assessment
approach of how different attack scenarios may occur under
different attackers intent, opportunity, capability, and pref-
erence against a network configuration. However, our work
is richer in terms of attack planning strategies.
Matherly [23] Provided a theoretical framework to in-
vestigate and identify the best strategy for combining red
teams and social psychology techniques to improve adver-
sary prediction. Bergin [13] presented a cyber-attack and
defense simulation framework to support the modeling and
simulation of cyber-attack and defense for training and as-
sessment. The work focused on modeling and simulation for
cybersecurity of autonomous vehicle systems (wireless com-
munications) used by US Armed Forces. Applebaum et al.
[24] developed a framework that used MITRE framework-
Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge
(ATT&CK). Their framework specifically takes into account
the post-compromise effect that an adversary can take in a
network.
Choo et al. [25] leveraged parallel processing, evolution-
ary algorithms and agent-based simulations to develop an
automated RT (ART) framework for a military operation.
The framework consists of (1) ART parameter setting inter-
face which will allow the initial selection of the parameters
that are to be varied, (2) ART controller - controls and
coordinates the whole process of the framework, (3) the
simulation model-dependent modules add a layer of data
flow to and from the framework and simulation model of
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Contributions highlight
[9], [10], [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16], [17], [18] [19] [7], [8] This paper
Automation framework 7 X X X X 7 X 7 X
Detailed attack planning 7 7 7 X 7 X 7 7 X
Scalable GSM 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X X
Experiments X X X X X 7 X 7 X
the parameters to be executed, (4) the EA module prepared
the parameters for the simulations and analysis using any of
the EAs, (5) the condor provides a job queuing, scheduling
policy and resource management for distributed computing
and (6) the output module is used to provide feedback,
update and run results. In Chua et al. [26], the capability
of the ART framework in [25] was evaluated against the
manual RT using two maritime security scenarios.
Yuen et al. [15] developed an ART framework that uses
automated planning and knowledge representation tech-
niques to conduct the RT exercise. The high-level view
of the framework consists of the world model (i.e., the
overall system that is being red-teamed), AI planner, AG
generator, threat analysis, course of action planning, change
deployment, etc.
Noor et al. [27] presented a machine learning framework
for investigating data breaches based on common patterns
from threat repositories. The framework reasons on cy-
bersecurity incidence by mapping low-level threat artifacts
to high-level adversary tactic, techniques and procedures
in a way that machines can identify these connections
with certain probabilities. In [28], the authors presented a
machine learning-based approach to automatically extract
cyber threats information such as attack patterns and tech-
niques that may represent attacker behaviours or attack ex-
ploits. These approaches are different from our framework
as they have focused on mapping information from existing
repositories or threat artifacts based on probability to attacks
while our proposed automation framework is based on real-
time attack information and execution on a network.
2.2 Attack Planning
Identifying a workable attack path can be time-consuming
for the RT, and so automated planning techniques are being
considered as a feasible method of discovering possible
attack paths for automating the RT agent. There are a
few works on the application of planning techniques for
reasoning in emulation/simulation of attacker behavior.
Boddy et al. [29] presented an approach for the generation
of adversary course of action from the initial state to the
target machine using a classical planning technique. This
planning approach was used to predict the attacker actions.
Obes et al. [16] used Planning Domain Definition Language
(PDDL) description of networks hosts, vulnerabilities and
exploit to generate attack paths which were integrated into
a penetration testing (pentest) tool. Elsbroek et al. [17] also
used the PDDL to generate attack paths for a pentest tool.
Sarraute et al. [18] addressed the problem of attack plan-
ning by taking into account uncertainty about the results of
the attacker’s actions, then modeling it as the probability
of success for each action. In another work, Sarraute et
al. [30] modeled the attack planning problem in terms of
Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDP)
for a pentest. Applebaum et al. [24] and Miller et al. [31]
used classical planning, Markov Decision Processes, and
Monte Carlo simulations to plan attacks for an automated
red teaming system (named Caldera).
Ghost et al. [32] proposed an approach based on a search
algorithm for the AG that automatically generates attack
paths (i.e., using a planner as a low-level module). Durkota
et al. [33] used AGs to determine attackers next actions. The
authors compute the attackers set of possible actions based
on AG reduction.
Randhawa et al. [34] presented an automated planning
and cyber red-teaming system called Trogdor. Randhawa et
al. described Trogdor as a mission-centric red-teaming and
defensive decision support system that can generate and
visualize potential attack paths for known vulnerabilities for
a networked system. The Trogdor used domain ontologies
to describe the target environment; the network informa-
tion and inter-dependencies between them, and the known
software or hardware vulnerabilities. Ghanem & Chen [35]
proposed a reinforcement learning technique, where the
system (named IAPTS) is modeled as a POMDP, and tested
using an external POMDP-solver with different algorithms.
According to Ghenem & Chen, the proposed system can
act as a module and can be integrated with most of the
industrial pentesting frameworks to improve efficiency and
accuracy.
Technologies such as Parallel Computing and Evolution-
ary Algorithms (EAs) are used to plan the red teaming
exercise as well, where the Parallel Computing is leveraged
to perform millions of simulations runs in an automated
way, while EAs is used to optimize the required fitness
value that can serve as the objective function. Specifically,
the evolutionary algorithm is used to plan and decide de-
fense options within the least amount of time. For example,
Choo et al. [25] used the evolution algorithms as the search
algorithm to search for red parameters that result in the
“defeat of blue then fix the parameter.
Contributions: It is difficult for network defender’s to
employ offensive testing techniques to evaluate a network
security posture because they need to frequently search for
well-defined attack scenario that may be open to attackers.
This process is time-consuming, costly and impractical to
perform regularly. Moreover, it depends on the quality of
the team members to effectively plan and execute attacks. In
this paper, we propose a novel framework for automating
the modeling of cyber-attacks. The framework will support
the automatic assessment of networks security by collecting
attack information and then exploiting them, just like a real
attacker would necessarily perform. By doing so, a defender
can understand the appropriate network weak spots and
4deploy the best form of available cyber defense.
Existing frameworks that used the AGs to identify overall
potential attack paths suffer from computational complexity
[8]. As a result, it is challenging to represent a full range of
cyber-attacks with the AGs due to the numerous possibil-
ities and choices that are available to the attacker. In this
paper, we incorporate a scalable security model (HARM) to
reduces this complexity. Moreover, we develop and auto-
mate three new metric-based attack planning strategies that
automatically generate a more specific and realistic attack
path to use (because the HARM or AGs does not explicitly
specify what attack path will be exploited per time). In
addition, we model the networks with nodes and edges,
in which the nodes have various attributes that model
the node components such as the operating system (OS),
vulnerabilities, open port, etc in order to allow for multiple
simulations in different scenarios. In Table 1, we highlight
our contributions compared to similar approaches. We use
the symbols Xand 7 to show papers contribution and those
that did not, respectively.
3 METHODOLOGY OF THE AUTOMATION OF
THREAT AND DEFENSE MODELING
Automating the attacker’s and defender’s operation will
require detailed modeling of the interaction between the
attacker and the defender on a target network. To achieve
this, we develop a framework for the automation of the
threats, attacks and defenses. First, we specify the require-
ments for the automation in Section 3.1. We use high-level
cyber-attacks descriptions and then use an attack model
similar to the cyber kill chain and the MITRE ATT&CK for
our attacker model. We believe using an accepted security
model will provide a realistic result hence, we adopt a deter-
ministic planning strategy (metric-based) with the HARM
to model the attacker’s course of actions with the network
components, respectively.
3.1 Requirements Analysis on the Automation of
Threat and Attack Modeling
In this section, we discuss the requirements for the automa-
tion of cyber-attacks. Here, the main focus is to provide
the detail requirements analysis to model the attacker along
with his actions for the red team model. Figure 1 shows the
requirements analysis steps. These requirements analysis
steps will support the simulations and executions of attacks
and defenses for the real systems. There are four steps in the
requirements analysis and each step will correspondingly
describe the requirements for each phase in the automation
framework (shown in section 3.2). We list the requirement
analysis steps as follows; (i) Data collection, (ii) Graphical
Security Model (GSM) Construction, (iii), Attack Planning,
and (iv) Attack Execution and Evaluation. We use Figure 1
to explain these steps as follows.
The data collection phase requires the network, threat
and attacker information, and defenses information from the
real environment, where the network consists of hosts, the
host’s configurations, vulnerability, open and close ports,
service, etc. These network information can be collected
using existing tools such as NMap [36] and OpenVAS [37].
Similarly, existing databases of attack tactics and techniques
can be used to gather information about attacks and their
behavior. For instance, the MITRE ATT&CK framework
[38] can be used to provide atomic actions on real-world
attacker’s tactics, techniques, and common knowledge. Be-
sides, the security administrator can provide other infor-
mation regarding the attacker’s knowledge and the list of
available hardening options.
In the GSM construction phase, a GSM and metric(s)
are required to analyze and process the data collected.
Specifically, the GSM uses the network information (hosts,
vulnerabilities, services, ports, etc) to construct and build a
model which represent the security posture of the network
at that time, and security metric to quantitatively measure
the security posture. Using the GSM and a specified security
metric, attack paths and metric values can be calculated and
an output will be generated.
The attack planning phase requires a planning strategy
and an attack language. The planning strategy determines
the attack plan while the attack language will bridge the
attack plan with the attack execution (i.e., next phase) in a
universal way. As part of this phase, the output generated
from the data analysis phase is passed to the planning
strategy and the attack language to generate and translate
the attack plan to be executed, respectively. In the attack exe-
cution and evaluation phase, attack tools (such as Metasploit
[39] or any other attack tools) is required. Also, an attack
language is needed for the attack execution since it needs
to translate the attack plans before executing them. This
phase recursively requires input from the attack planner to
determine viable attack paths for execution. Attack paths
which cannot be executed are eliminated and then the
output from the planner is updated for the next execution.
The execution is reviewed automatically and the results are
used for the next iteration(s).
3.2 An Attack and Defense Automation Framework
The main goal of the framework is to develop a method
to automatically assess the security of a network from the
combined view of the attacker and the defender. So, this
framework is aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of defense
strategies against cyber-attacks in real systems by lunching
real attacks. In Figure 2, we show the different phases of
the automation framework and we list them as follows; 1)
Information collection, 2) Security model construction and
analysis, 3) Attack planning, and 4) Attack execution and
evaluation. We explain each phase as follows.
3.2.1 Information collection
A lot of information can be collected from a network en-
vironment [40]. However, this framework uses only the
relevant information required to construct the attack and
defense model. The proposed framework incorporate vul-
nerability scanning tool, and network and open ports dis-
covery tool together to automatically collect information.
However, the framework is not limited to the information
collected via the scanning and discovery tools, as network
administrators are allowed to provide other information as
well. For example, a network administrator may have a
network map of the devices found on his network including
5Fig. 1. The requirement analysis phases
their configuration information (an example network map is
shown in [41]). Such a map (which provides the network
topology) can be used as input in this phase. Besides,
security tools such as OpenVAS [37] Nessus [42] and Nmap
[36] can be used as well to collect the hosts’ vulnerability
information, operating systems, services port, etc.
3.2.2 Security model construction and analysis
In the second phase, a two-layered HARM of the network
is generated using the information that is collected in phase
1. All potential attack paths are captured and enumerated
in the HARM, whence the possible attack scenarios are
well captured. For security analysis, the security decision-
maker can select the security metrics to use with the security
model. Here, the computed security metrics via the model
will be used to make decisions on the attack plan. Therefore,
this phase evaluates every attack path based on their risk,
damages or probability of a successful attack, depending on
the selected security metrics.
3.2.3 Attack Planning
This phase is responsible for planning and generating
actions for the adversary (attacker) agent. Here, a plan may
include a response from the next host/target, port scanning
and IP ranging, or targeted actions such as exploiting a
software vulnerability of a host, sending a spear-phishing
email, etc. Various approaches may be used with the HARM
to strategically generate possible attack plans. We describe
these approaches in Section 4.
We have chosen to use metrics-based attack planning and
HARM to generate attack plans for attackers in the form
of attack scenarios. We can generate deterministic attack
plans based on the metrics used in the HARM. The attack
plans can be formulated in the attack language. The main
reason to use an attack language is to allow the created
attacks plans to be universal and useful for different types
of attacks and defense tools. Moreover, attack plans written
in a universal attack language can be converted to a suitable
format used for such attacks and defense tools.
3.2.4 Attack Execution and Evaluation
In this paper, we initially choose to use the Metasploit as
an attacking tool for exploitation of vulnerabilities. Here,
the output generated from the attack planning phase is
fed to the attack execution and evaluation phase as inputs
for executions. Our current implementation is not support-
ing conversion from the security model language to the
Metasploit compatible outputs. Instead, we implemented a
direct conversion from metrics-based planning outputs to a
Metasploit compatible format. The attacks are performed on
the vulnerabilities that have been discovered from the initial
‘information collection’ phase. It is important to highlight
that the attack execution phase recursively works with the
attack planning phase.
In Figure 3, we describe the relationship between the attack
planning phase with the attack execution and evaluation
phase. We describe each of the stages as follows.
• Attack Planner carries the list of the attack paths
(passed from phase 2), each path is an ordered list
of nodes (representing the hosts) and each node
contains hosts information and vulnerability infor-
mation. Besides, it also carries the attack plan to be
executed.
• Vulnerability Search will extract the keywords
(e.g.Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE),
OS) which describes possible vulnerability informa-
tion of each node and return an exploit module
(e.g.exploit/windows/smb/ms17 010 psexec) that
can be understood by the adversary program.
• Exploitation will extract the host information of each
node, along with the exploit module extracted by the
Search, then start the exploitation process.
• Feedback will be generated after the sequence of
exploitation’s is finished. Specifically, feedback is
generated for the following two scenarios; (1) all
the nodes on the attack path have been success-
fully traversed and exploited. (2) some (or all) of
the nodes on the attack path cannot be exploited
(which terminates’ the process of the attack for that
particular path). In this case, an attack will fail
for different reasons such as, a node on the attack
path is not exploitable, the vulnerability information
provided by the planner (phase 3) does not match
with the host’s real vulnerabilities, or the host is not
down/not available.
4 A PROPOSE ATTACK PLANNING STRATEGY
Reasoning and planning an adversary course of actions to
achieve a target is a difficult task. An automated planner
can logically decide the sequence of actions to achieve a set
of goal. However, depending on the adversary’s learning
ability of the network, attack plans may be conceived in
various ways. For example, an attacker that has global
knowledge of the network environment can plan varying
6Fig. 2. A framework for attack and defense automation
Fig. 3. Attack Planner with Attack Execution Flow
attacks compared to the attacker with partial knowledge.
Using the HARM, various possible attack plans can be
systematically generated for the red team exercise. In this
regard, we consider attackers with the following network
knowledge with the HARM; (1) Global learning, and (2)
Partial learning. We propose the following metric-based
attack planning strategies. We consider that these planning
strategies may be used with other automated frameworks
that use GSM (such as AGs)).
• Path-based approach: for example, the shortest attack
path
• Composite metrics (e.g., probability of attack success
with attack paths)
• Atomic metric (e.g., attack cost only)
In the next sections, we present and describe algorithms
for computing the attacker plan using three different metric-
based approaches. These algorithms are the key components
in the attack planning phase of the automated framework.
In Table 2, we provide the notations used for the rest of the
paper.
4.1 Path-based approach
Attack vectors enable attackers to exploit system
vulnerabilities and to reach their goals. One aspect of
an attack vector is an attack path. An attack path is a
sequence of steps with one or more vulnerabilities that can
be exploited by attackers to gain access to specific assets
in a network, hence, forming an exploitable attack path
between the assets. In this section, we consider the attack
paths to develop an attack planning strategy.
TABLE 2
Notations
Notation Meaning
h is a host
ap is an attack path
AP is a set of attack paths
ph is the probability of attack success of h
aIh is the attack impact h
SP is the shortest attack path metric
H is set of hosts
E is set of edges
Assuming that an attacker has global knowledge of the
target network, where the attacker knows the network
topology, assets vulnerability information and the specific
target asset. Then a rational attacker is more likely to
select and compromise the set of machines with a shorter
distance to the target. Here, we can utilize one or more
of the path-based security metrics to strategically plan an
attacker’s sequence of actions to accomplish the attack
goal. We use the shortest path metric [20] to generate
deterministic attack plans based on analysis on the HARM.
We define the shortest path metric as follows.
Shortest path metric: The shortest attack path is defined
as the minimum distance from the attacker to the attacker’s
goal and it is formally defined by Equation (1). This metric
equation finds the smallest number of sequence of hosts
to the target machine that an attacker must use to achieve
the attack goal. The HARM can model the security posture
of a network, and so can be used to compute attack paths
and risks associated with hosts vulnerabilities based on the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Base Score
(BS) metrics. Specifically, we use the upper layer of HARM
to find the potential attack paths to the attacker’s goal.
Hence, this provides us with the set of the potential paths
that will be open to the attacker.
The shortest attack path metric is calculated in the upper
layer of HARM using the formula in Equation (1), where
AP is a set containing different attack paths.
SP = min |AP| (1)
Computing the shortest attack path metric may generate
a set of possible attack scenarios consisting of multiple at-
tack paths for the attack execution (phase 4) [43]. However,
a single attacker would typically choose a single attack path
7Algorithm 1 Attack plan using Shortest Path Metric
1: procedure FIND SHORTEST ATTACK PATHS(Network)
2: Initialise Paths→ [ ]
3: Initialise Full Plan→ [ ]
4: HARM = HARM Model(Network)
5: Paths→ Find All Paths(HARM)
6: SP = min(Paths)
7: for all path ∈ Paths do
8: if —path— == SP then
9: append path to Full Plan
10: end if
11: end for
12: if —Full Plan— == 1 then
13: max risk = 0
14: Initialise Reduce Plan→ [ ]
15: Plan→ ∅
16: for all path ∈ Full Plan do
17: Risk = 0
18: for all host ∈ path do
19: Risk = phost × aIhost
20: end for
21: if Risk > max risk then
22: max risk→ Risk
23: end if
24: append path to Plan
25: Plan→ path
26: end for
27: Reduce Plan→ Plan
28: return Reduce Plan
29: else
30: return Full Plan
31: end if
32: end procedure
per time. Hence, a suitable approach is needed to carefully
select the most appropriate attack plan to execute first given
multiple attack paths. To address this, we rank the attack
paths generated. Specifically, we apply prioritization to the
attack paths based on risk, where the most concerning or
the most critical attack path is selected first. Other criteria
such as the most likely attack to succeed, the attacks with
high impact if successful, the expensive attacks (in terms of
economic metrics), etc can be used as well. To prioritize,
we compute the risk (i.e., the expected value of impact)
associated with each attack paths based on CVSS BS. The
formula for the path-based risk is given by Equation (2).
Riskap =
∑
h∈ap
ph × aIh, ap ∈ AP (2)
Algorithm 1 describe the shortest attack path metric
planning. We summarise the algorithm as follows. A net-
work and set of security information are provided as input
to the algorithm. HARM is used to calculate possible attack
scenarios (attack paths) to a specific target. Equation (1) and
Equation (2) are used to compute the set of shortest attack
paths and the attack paths prioritization (i.e., if there are
multiple shortest paths) via the HARM, respectively. Then,
the final plan is returned as the attack plan to be used in the
third phase of the automation framework.
4.2 Composite metrics approach
Often, attackers’ may be having multiple interests, in which
individual security metric may not be able to capture. For
example, an attacker may be interested in performing a
multistage attack, and also be interested in compromising
the hosts with a high likelihood of attack success to reach
the target. To capture such scenarios, we propose an attack
planning strategy based on composite metrics. Composite
metrics combine individual metrics to form a new metric.
For example, the attributes of a multistage attack (i.e., attack
paths) are combined with the probability of attack success
metric to form a metric named probability of attack success
on paths [44]. This metric assesses the likelihood of an attack
to be successful via an attack path and it is calculated by
equation (3) and (4). The attack path with the maximum P
(from (4)) is extracted for the attack planner.
The procedure for this approach is similar to Algorithm
1 but with a different type of metric. As a result, we did not
show an algorithm for it.
pap =
∏
h∈ap
ph, ap ∈ AP (3)
P = max
ap∈AP
pap (4)
4.3 Atomic metric approach
In the previous subsection, we have considered an attacker
with full knowledge of the network, where the attacker
has perfect information about the network. However, a real
attacker may not know the complete network reachability
information (i.e., the topology), but she/he may have partial
knowledge about a few networked hosts that are available
to the public. Hence, we assume an attacker with incremen-
tal learning ability and a specific target machine as the attack
goal. Then, we develop a planning strategy base on atomic
security metric.
One important decision factor to both an attacker and the
defender is costs [45]. We consider the cost of attacks based
on attack effort or the difficulty of exploiting the vulnera-
bilities (i.e, from the attacker’s perspective). The attack cost
of exploiting hosts vulnerabilities can be estimated using
different ways. For instance, the CVSS [46] provides vulner-
ability exploitability score which shows the difficulty of ex-
ploiting the vulnerability. We can use the CVSS vulnerability
exploitability score as attack cost metric for vulnerabilities.
The hosts’ attack costs metric is calculated from the lower
layer of HARM based on the host AT. A detailed explanation
of the calculations of the attack costs metrics based on ATs
is provided in [44].
We use the attack cost metric (from the perspective of
the attacker) to determine the attacker choice of the host
to exploits. Typically, an attacker may choose hosts with
a lower attack effort for a multistage attack to a target
machine. We use this idea to develop an attack planning
strategy when the attacker has only partial knowledge of
the network. The attacker moves incrementally from the
initial host to an adjacent host based on their reachability
and attack cost value until the attack goal is reached.
Algorithm 2 is used to explain this attack planning approach
with the following context. The attacker has access to (and
8knows) only the device that is open to the public (e.g., a
web server). the attacker will be able to gain root control
of the devices open to the public, leveraging an existing
vulnerability. This could happen because the vulnerability
couldn’t be patched due to software dependencies or time to
patch. The attacker may be able to discover the hosts that are
reachable from the web servers (e.g., the application server)
that are located in the internal network. Then, the attacker
can scan the hosts for vulnerabilities and then exploit the
easiest vulnerability (low attack effort) then move to the
next host. Here, the firewalls may not be able to block the
connection as the attacker is using a legitimate user account
and privileges. The target only accepts connections from
the internal networked hosts, and so the attacker can reach
the target and then escalate the target’ privilege to admin
privilege using existing vulnerabilities.
Algorithm 2 Attack planning with incremental learning
using attack cost metric
1: procedure INCREMENTAL LEARNING(Network)
2: Initialise Path→ [ ]
3: HARM = (H,E)
4: K is the set of attacker’s entry points and initial
location K ⊆ H
5: for all K ⊆ H do
6: Scan for vulnerabilities
7: min ac = 10
8: Plan = ∅
9: for all host ∈ K do
10: compute achost
11: if achost 6 min ac then
12: min ac = achost
13: end if
14: Plan← host
15: end for
16: Append Plan to Path
17: end for
18: while attack target /∈ Path do
19: lastElement= Get Last element (Path)
20: SetHosts← Get hosts adjacent to lastElement
21: Next Plan = ∅
22: min ac = 10
23: for all host ∈ SetHosts do
24: compute achost
25: if achost 6 min ac then
26: min ac = achost
27: end if
28: Next Plan← host
29: end for
30: Append Next Plan to Path
31: end while
32: end procedure
5 ATTACK AND DEFENSE MODELING AND AU-
TOMATION WITH THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
We perform an experiment to illustrate our proposed frame-
work. We focused on analyzing network security and
demonstrating each phase of the framework using a case
study network and simulations. The case study network and
TABLE 3
The network firewall rules
Host Rechability
Attacker→ 206.171.47.1, 206.171.47.2
206.171.47.1→ 206.171.47.3, 206.171.47.4, 206.171.47.7
206.171.47.3→ 206.171.47.5, 206.171.47.7
206.171.47.4→ 206.171.47.6
206.171.47.6→ 206.171.47.7
206.171.47.5→ 206.171.47.7
206.171.47.2→ 206.171.47.3
the assumptions used in the experiments are described in
the next section.
5.1 Case Study
Many enterprise networks only realized that they have
been attacked after discovering disparity in their activities
or log files [47]. Businesses and enterprise networks’
administrators must understand their security posture to
provide an optimum defense. In this section, for simplicity,
we use a small corporate network as our case study.
Network Model
A small subset of an operational university network is
used as our network. The network consists of 7 hosts with
each host running windows operating system (OS). We
assume that the network has one firewall which controls
access between the networked hosts, and the firewall rules
for the network is shown in Table 3. In this paper, for
confidentiality, we did not use the actual IP addresses that
were collected from the real network directly. However, we
use the hosts’ OSes and vulnerabilities as collected.
We assume one of the hosts with IP address 206.171.47.7
contains sensitive financial data and it is protected by the
firewall, such that there is no direct access to the host -
206.171.47.7 (e.g., in a 3-tier network architecture). However,
the network users are able to reach the hosts 206.171.47.7
after passing through other hosts e.g., 206.171.47.1 or
206.171.47.2.
Attacker’s Profile
In this section, we provide a detailed profile of the attacker.
• There is only a single attacker.
• The attacker is a legitimate network user who does
not have permission to access sensitive data on the
internal network hosts.
• The attacker has access to some basic tools such as
Nmap [36], Nessus [42], OpenVAS [37], etc and so,
he can easily obtain information about the network
topology and vulnerabilities information.
• The attacker can scan the network and discover some
vulnerabilities.
• The attacker can find one or more hosts on the
network that are having the SMB vulnerability, as a
result, he/she can perform a remote code execution
attack.
• The attacker’s goal is to execute code and gain a
foothold on at-least one of the hosts using the SMB
vulnerabilities, then expand access laterally through
the networks until the target host is reached.
9In the next section, we demonstrate the proposed frame-
work giving the network and the attacker’s profile.
5.1.1 Data collection
The first phase of the framework was used to gather related
information from the network, such information includes,
the networked hosts, their reachability information and the
hosts’ vulnerabilities and metrics. This information was
collected and fed into the framework as input. Basically,
7 hosts and 27 vulnerabilities which were associated with
the different version of Windows OSes were collected. The
collected hosts and vulnerabilities information are shown in
Table 4 (some of the networked hosts have the same number
and types of vulnerabilities) and one instance of the network
topology is shown in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. The Network Topology
TABLE 4
The list of hosts and their vulnerabilities
Hosts, Vulnerabilities and Metrics
Hosts ID Vulnerability Name CVSSBS
206.171.47.3
DCE Services Enumeration
Reporting 5.0
SMBv1 Unspecified Remote
Code Execution (Shadow Brokers) 10.0
TCP timestamps 2.6
206.171.47.1
SMBv1 Unspecified Remote
Code Execution (Shadow Brokers) 10.0
TCP timestamps 2.6
206.171.47.4,
206.171.47.5,
206.171.47.7
SMBv1 Unspecified Remote
Code Execution (Shadow Brokers) 10.0
DCE Services Enumeration
Reporting 5.0
SSL/TLS: Certificate Signed Using
A Weak Signature Algorithm 4.0
SSL/TLS: Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange Insufficient DH Group
Strength Vulnerability
4.0
SSL/TLS: Report Weak Cipher
Suites 4.3
TCP timestamps 2.6
206.171.47.6,
206.171.47.2 TCP timestamps 2.6
5.1.2 GSM construction and security analysis
Once the information from phase 1 is collected, a GSM is
built and security metrics are calculated. Here, the frame-
work was used to construct a HARM of the network, where
the reachability information is captured in the upper layer
and the vulnerability in the lower layer. Other information
such as port number, services running can also be repre-
sented. Based on the HARM, we automatically generate
possible attack paths to the target hosts (i.e., the host with
IP address 206.171.47.7). The HARM with the hosts CVSS
BS score (used as risk metrics) is shown in Figure 5.
In this phase, we can also visualize the security model
constructed and analysis report. A screenshot of the user
interface showing the HARM upper layer, the lower layer
and the security analysis report are shown in the Appen-
dices section.
This phase also handles to computations and analysis of the
shortest attack path and host risk.
Fig. 5. The HARM of the network with risk metrics
5.1.3 Attack planning
The attack plan is the third phase of the framework. We use
HARM with shortest attack path metric to plan attacker’s
actions, where the HARM finds all the possible set of
paths to reach the target, and also calculate the shortest
attack paths based on the metric calculations. Specifically,
Algorithm 1 is use for this attack planning.
Table 5 and Table 6 shows the set of attack paths gen-
erated for the network model used, and the attack plan
computed based on Algorithm 1, respectively.
TABLE 5
The list of possible attack paths generated
The attack paths
ap1
Attacker→ 206.171.47.2→ 206.171.47.3→
206.171.47.5→ 206.171.47.7
ap2
Attacker→ 206.171.47.1→ 206.171.47.3→
206.171.47.5→ 206.171.47.7
ap3
Attacker→ 206.171.47.2→ 206.171.47.3→
206.171.47.7
ap4 Attacker→ 206.171.47.1→ 206.171.47.7
ap5
Attacker→ 206.171.47.1→ 206.171.47.4→
206.171.47.6→ 206.171.47.7
ap6
Attacker→ 206.171.47.1→ 206.171.47.3→
206.171.47.7
TABLE 6
The attack plan generated using Algorithm 1
The attack plan
ap4 Attacker→ 206.171.47.1→ 206.171.47.7
Since we are using only a small network with a few
hosts and less network density, there is only one shortest
path to the target. However, a large network may have
multiple attack paths as the shortest path to the target. In
this regard, the attack planner will need to select the most
critical path from the list of the shortest paths by prioritizing
the attack paths using attack path risk metrics. Here, the
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selected critical path is the attack path having the highest
risk value.
5.1.4 Attack Execution and Evaluation
To demonstrate this phase, we utilized the Metasploit frame-
work [39] as our adversary attacking tool to attack the
windows machine in the network. We choose the Metasploit
because it is one of the best-known attacking tools used by
cyber-criminals as well as ethical hackers to probe system-
atic vulnerabilities on networks. Moreover, it is an open-
source framework which can easily be customized and used
with most OSes. Besides, any attack tool can be developed
and used with this framework.
In this phase, we fed the attack execution phase
with the attack plan generated from phase 3 for exe-
cution. In particular, we customized the Metasploit to
process the attacker’s actions based on the output from
our attack planner. Here, we utilize the Metasploit’s
attacks. First, the framework chooses the exploit ”ex-
ploit/windows/smb/ms17 010 eternalblue” and then at-
tack the initial host - 206.171.47.7. Following that setting,
the payload ”payload/generic/shell reverse tcp” is used to
exploit the host.
Typically, Metasploit is used as an interactive tool or
repl (read, evaluate, print, loop), (i.e., meaning user type
in a command, the interactive shell execute the command
and print the result, and then the interactive shell waits for
users to type in the next command), but for this framework,
we automate the attack execution with least human inter-
actions. Specifically, we use the resource script mechanism
provided by the Metasploit, the resource script mechanism
allow batching multiple Metasploit commands and execute
them as one. We summarise the resource script used to
attack one host as follows:
To implement the attack in sequence, we implemented
python functions to generate the resource script based on
the generated attack plan (from phase 3). Since the resource
script mechanism can automate only single exploitation for
a single host, we use Pymetasploit3 [48] to automate the
exploitation for a sequence of hosts on an attack path (given
from the planner). In Figure 6, we show the attack flow, and
then we described the attack execution with the following
steps:
1) Launch Metasploit program with command msfcon-
sole
2) Activate the Metasploit rpc mechanism with com-
mand load msgrpc Pass=test within Metasploit con-
sole interface.
3) the Python program reads the attack plan generated
from phase 3 and generates an attack path, which
is just a python list data structure, then pass the
python list to step 4.
4) the Python program checks whether the python list
is empty. If it is, stop. If it is not, pops out the first
node in the python list, and pass that node to step
4.
5) the Python program generates Metasploit resource
script by extracting information from the node, and
then via rpc make the Metasploit to start exploita-
tion. If the node is successfully exploited, a com-
mand shell is returned which can be used to control
the machine, and then the next step continues based
on step 3. However, if the node cannot be exploited,
then, it terminates.
Fig. 6. The attack execution and evaluation steps
Table 7 shows the complete report on the attack executed
for one attack path. Here, the report captures the host’s ID,
the status of the host at the time of the exploitation (i.e.,
whether it is running or unavailable, the status of exploit
(exploited or failed), etc.
6 EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
We perform real experiments based on a commercial cloud-
Amazon Web Services (AWS) [49] on two network mod-
els; (i) A three tiers network, (ii) A flat network. We use
Amazons Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) to obtain and con-
figure 101 virtual computer nodes (hosts). We deploy our
framework on one of the Amazon’s host which serve as
the red team agent. Next, we use the remaining 100 hosts
to create a network for the experiments. In Section 6.1, we
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TABLE 7
The attack report generated after executing the attack plan
Aack Report
The aacker’s (aacking host) ID: 192.168.1.14,
The total number of hosts exploited: 2
Description: [{
Order of exploit on path: Host 001,
Host ID: 206.171.47.1,
Host running: true,
Host exploited: true,
CVE ID: 2017-0143,
Exploit used: ”exploit/windows/smb/ms17 010 eternalblue”,
The payload used: ”payload/generic/shell reverse tcp”,
Vulnerabilities associated with aack type: CVE-2017-0143,
CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145, CVE-2017-0146,
CVE-2017-0147, CVE-2017-0148, MSB-MS17-010
},
{
Order of exploit on path: Host 002,
Host ID: 206.171.47.7,
Host running: true,
Host exploited: true,
CVE ID: 2017-0143,
Exploit used: ”exploit/windows/smb/ms17 010 eternalblue”,
The payload used: ”payload/generic/shell reverse tcp”,
Vulnerabilities associated with aack type: CVE-2017-0143,
CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145, CVE-2017-0146,
CVE-2017-0147, CVE-2017-0148, MSB-MS17-010
}]
describe the network configurations used. In Section 6.2, we
perform two experiments, where we investigate the time it
takes to successfully process and executes each phase of the
automation framework on two network models.
6.1 Network settings
The setup for the experiments is shown in Figure 7 and
Figure 8. In the first model, the network is divided into
three subnets; subnet 1, subnet 2 and subnet 3. In the second
model, the network has only one subnet where all the hosts
are located. Hosts in the experiment networks have either
the Windows or Linus OS.
Each network model has Security Groups (SG) which speci-
fies the access to hosts IP, ports or subnets. The specifications
in the SG is provided in Table 9, where SG 1 is represented
by subnet 1, etc. The SG rules allow users outside the
network to reach hosts in subnet 1 (in which the attacker
is also a user), and the users cannot directly connect to hosts
in subnet 2 or subnet 3. Hosts in subnet 1 are allowed to
connect to hosts subnet 2, and also hosts in subnet 2 are
allowed connection to hosts in subnet 3. For the second
model, the SG rules allows all connections from the outside
to a few hosts in the network before allowing access to other
hosts in the network.
Attacker’s goal
We assume some of the hosts have sensitive information
and the attack goal is for the attacker to reach the hosts and
escalate privileges, then steal information on the host.
We use different targets in the experiments. For the three
tier network, we performed experiments with (a) when the
target is located subnet 1, (b) when the target is located
TABLE 8
AWS resources for the experiments
No. Instancetype Images Specifications
1
(RT agent host) t2.medium
Ubuntu
18.04 LTS
Mem:4GB,
vCPU:2
98 t2.micro AmazonLinux 2
Mem:1GB,
vCPU:1
2 t2.micro Windows Server 2008 Mem:1GB,vCPU:1
Fig. 7. Three tiers network setup in the AWS
TABLE 9
The security groups access control rules
Three tiers network (Fig. 7) Flat network (Fig. 8)
Host in Accept from Host Accept from
Subnet 1 All 10.50.16.73 & All
Subnet 2 Subnet 1 10.50.16.82
Subnet 3 Subnet 2 All 10.50.16.73, 10.50.16.82
Fig. 8. Flat network setup in the AWS
in subnet 2, and (c) when the target is located subnet 3,
as shown in Table 11. For network model 2, we use two
scenarios; (a) the target is having a Linus OS, and (b) the
target is having a windows OS.
6.2 The Experiments
Using the network configuration in Section 6.1, we perform
experiments to measure the time to process and execute each
phase of the framework. We use two network model with
the same number of hosts in the Amazon AWS, and the
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setup for these networks are shown in Figure 7 and Figure
8.
6.2.1 Analysis of Phase 1
The framework is used to collect data from the network on
Amazon EC2, where OpenVAS and the SG inbound traffic
are utilized to automatically collect vulnerabilities and hosts
reachabilities, respectively. The SG rules are summarized in
Table 9 and the vulnerabilities information are provided as
supplementary material with this paper. Here, both network
models have the same hosts and vulnerabilities, hence we
used the same results collected from the vulnerability scan-
ner as the input in the experiments. From the experiments,
a total of 2406 vulnerabilities were collected from 100 hosts
using a fast and full scan, out of which 1565 have CVE
ID and 841 have no CVE ID. In these experiments, only
vulnerabilities with CVE ID are used.
Metrics values are automatically extracted from the hosts’
vulnerabilities. In particular, this framework extracts the
CVSS BS of vulnerabilities that have a CVE ID (the CVSS BS
provide the severity of each vulnerability [50] with 10 being
the most severe). We automatically assign the probability of
attack success for each vulnerability based on the CVSS val-
ues (i.e., the CVSS BS score/10). Since the CVSS does not have
attack cost metrics, we also compute and assign attack cost
value to the vulnerabilities based on their severity scores
(i.e., a vulnerability with high severity value is assigned low
attack effort costs and vice versa).
In this phase, we measure the time to collect and pro-
cess the vulnerabilities and reachability information via the
framework, and the results are shown in Table 10.
The results show that the framework is able to completely
scan for 100 hosts in about 2hrs for the fast and full option.
This scanning time is fast compared to other scanning
options available (e.g., the full and very deep ultimate).
In addition, the scanning time can be reduced further by
reducing the port range or using other scanning options
(such as discovery), however, the number of vulnerabilities
captured may not be comprehensive. On the other hand,
the framework was able to process and populate the reach-
ability information and vulnerability information within a
few seconds each. Here, the reachability information was
processed based on the SG collected by considering the
inbound rules.
TABLE 10
Phase 1 and Phase 2: Average execution time
Framework Phase Three- tiers network Flat network
Phase 1
Vulnerability
Scanning 2 hrs 1min 50 sec
Processing
the vulnerabilities 0.2070 sec
Processing
security groups 0.0250 sec 0.0221 sec
Phase 2 HARMconstruction 7.3929 sec. 7.1809 sec
6.2.2 Analysis of Phase 2
Based on the output from Phase 1, a HARM is constructed
and the set of possible attack paths are generated for the
different network models. Here, we focused on measuring
the time to construct HARM for each of the network models.
The results are shown in Table 10.
The results show that the HARM for the network models
was built within a few seconds for both experiments. How-
ever, the flat network took less time to build compared to
the three-tiers network. This because the flat network has
less network density compared to the flat network.
6.2.3 Analysis of Phase 3
In this section, we analyse the time to generate attack plans
using the three proposed metric-based approach. These
approaches are (i) Atomic metric approach (attack cost), (ii)
Path-based approach (shortest path metric), and Composite
metrics (Probability of attack success on paths). We measure
the time to generate an attack plan for each strategy. The
results are shown in Table 11.
The results is shown in Table 11. For each network model,
we changed the location of the target host then compute an
attack plan for the different strategy. The results show that
the framework computes the attack plan within a minimal
time as shown in Table 11. Generally, we observe that the
composite metrics approach takes more time to generate
compared to other strategies, and depending on the density
of the network, the time to compute the attack plan can vary
for all planning strategies.
6.2.4 Analysis of Phase 4
The fourth phase is the attack executions and evaluation.
Here, based on the different attack plans generated from
Phase 3, we measure and compare the time it takes to
execute an attack plan on the two network models. In Table
12, we show the results of this experiments.
Similarly, the results show that the attack executions took
a few seconds to complete, with the attacks on the target
which is located in subnet 3 taking more time to complete
compared to target in subnet 2. Likewise, the attacks on the
target that is located in subnet 2 took more time to complete
compared to the target in subnet 1. This is because the
number of steps required to reach a target varies for each of
the subnets, where the target in subnet 3 having the highest
number of steps to be reached reach. Similarly, the attacks
on the flat network finished within a few seconds for target
1. However, on careful analysis of the time taken to complete
attacks via the various paths, we observed that paths having
the Windows OS (i.e., the target 2 scenario) takes much
time to complete compared to the other scenarios with only
the Linus OSes. So, the diversity of OSes on attack paths
increases the time to complete the attacks. Moreover, we
found that the Windows OSes have more vulnerabilities
than the Linus OS, as a result, this may increase the time
to exploit the vulnerabilities as the attack will make many
attempts before getting a vulnerability that works.
7 DISCUSSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
Cybersecurity modeling has been used primarily for
cybersecurity analysis, evaluation and improvement of
quantitative cyber threats, attacks and defensive strategies,
rather than being used for the red team (legitimate
attackers) and the blue team (defenders). To automate the
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TABLE 11
Phase 3: Average execution time (seconds)
Three- tiers network Flat network
Phase Approach Target insubnet 1
(IP: 10.50.16.77)
Target in
subnet 2
(IP: 10.50.17.117)
Target in
Subnet 3
(IP: 10.50.18.99)
Target 1
(Linux)
Target 2
(Windows OS)
atomic metric
(attack cost) 0.20284 0.1894 3.6331 0.0200 0.0500
Path-based
(Shortest path) 0.0944 0.1332 3.8298 0.0490 0.0320Phase 3 Composite
metric (Prob.) 3.6125 3.9341 4.6460 0.0820 0.1030
TABLE 12
Phase 4: Average execution time
Three- tiers network Flat network
Phase Approach Target insubnet 1
(IP: 10.50.16.77)
Target in
subnet 2
(IP: 10.50.17.117)
Target in
Subnet 3
(IP: 10.50.18.99)
Target 1
(Linux OS)
Target 2
(Windows OS)
atomic metric
(attack cost) 5.0545 8.8761 15.7772 10.0614 19.3675
Path-based
(Shortest path) 4.9455 9.9750 15.5750 10.0147 20.5737Phase 4 Composite
metric (Prob.) 5.0750 8.8844 15.7651 9.9501 20.8177
red team and the blue team for cybersecurity analysis, we
proposed a framework to model the assessments of threats,
attacks and defenses strategies from the perspective of an
attacker and the defender. In the following sections, we
discuss our work, limitations and future work.
Framework implementation: We have used a real network
to demonstrate the proposed framework. In particular,
we have illustrated Phase 1 to Phase 4 of the automation
framework. However, we have not implemented the
defense execution and evaluation framework and workflow.
It is necessary to design a defense model that provides
countermeasures to cyber threats. In our future work, we
will develop the defense framework and workflow. For
instance, Reed et al. [51] reported the defense workflow
within the Cyber Security Incidence Response Teams
(CSIRT) and showed how varying threats differentially
affect the workflow. We can develop a similar approach
for our blue team taking into account both conventional
and modern defenses. Moreover, we can also consider
collaborative defenders who are trying to defend the same
network.
Furthermore, we will also need to develop a defense
evaluation approach to fairly evaluate the effectiveness
of the defenses [52]. Security metrics can be developed
to evaluate the effectiveness of the different defense
approaches deploy, etc.
Attack Planning Strategies:
The focus of this paper is to automate threats and attack
executions. However, we have developed three detailed
metric-based planning strategies to use with the automation
framework. These planning strategies are simple and deter-
ministic, and in the future, we need to develop more plan-
ning strategies for non-deterministic scenarios, e.g., [18].
Multiple attackers: Although we have modeled a single
attacker compromising multiple hosts to reach a target,
next-generation cyber-attacks can involve collaborative
attackers trying to compromise the same targets, where
each of the attackers may have some specialized expertise
[53]. Besides, multiple attackers with different attack goals
is another scenario not included in this paper. So, more
research is required to include collaborative and cooperative
attackers, multiple attackers with multiple targets, etc. We
can also consider various attack scenarios (e.g., Distributed
Denial of Service attack [54]).
Attacker Capabilities: Our framework used the same
level of behaviour and capability for the attacker. However,
real-world attackers can have different behaviours and
capabilities which we did not take into account. As a
result, this limits our proposed approach to model different
kinds of attacks along with the changes in the behaviour
of the attacker. To extend our proposed approach, a
separate component (or module) which explicitly model
the changes in the attacker’s behaviour or the attacker’s
capabilities can be incorporated [55], [56]. Thus, this will
allow the security administrator to perform several types of
security assessment activities (e.g., based on the behavior
or capabilities of the attacker).
Attack tool: Several attack models exist that differ in
their objectives and structure (e.g., the cyber kill chain [57]).
In this paper, we have used the Metasploit framework. In
the future, we plan to develop our attacking tool based on
typical stages of attacks and the MITRE ATT&CK frame-
work [38]. We mention the MITRE ATT&CK because it
is built based on the analysis of publicly available threat
reports of actively used threats by an adversary. Moreover,
the ATT&CK provides insight into adversary’s life cycle by
grouping them into different levels (tactics and techniques)
that the adversary tries to achieve his goals. Although the
MITRE tactics and techniques do not provide any informa-
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tion on how the attacker might combine different techniques
to accomplish his/her goals, we can develop an approach
that is similar to the work of Al-Shaer et al. [58] and Husari
et al. [59] to analyze and characterize the MITRE techniques
to determine the relationships between the threat artifacts
for our model. In addition, we can also incorporate different
scenarios with an attacker having partial or full knowledge
of the network, etc.
Furthermore, it is important to take into account
all vulnerabilities, however some of the vulnerabilities
collected from the Amazon EC2 network have no CVE
IDs but names. As a result, it was difficult to map attacks
with vulnerabilities using their names in the attacking
tool. For the experiments, we filtered and used only the
vulnerabilities that have CVE IDs.
Attack language: An attack language will provide a
universal way to translate and bridge attack plan with
attack execution phase regardless of the attacking tool.
However, our current work does not include an attack
language, but it supports a direct conversion from the
planner to the Metasploit compatible format. In the future,
we plan to develop a HARMer language (an attack
language) to support the conversion from planner to the
Metasploit compatible or any other attacking tools.
Attacker learning approach and stop criteria: We
have demonstrated an attacker with global learning or
incremental learning of the network, and specific host as
the target. However, determining the attacker’s knowledge
of the network and the attacker’s target or goal is difficult.
As a result, there is a need to explore different scenarios
of the attacker’s knowledge. Besides, more stop criteria or
attack goals can be incorporated, such as; (1) a set of IP
addresses as a target, (2) Incremental learning until there
are no new hosts, (3) A certain percentage of hosts are
covered by the attacker, (4) Until a specific data is found
(e.g., secret information), etc.
Framework Evaluation: By using the proposed frame-
work, we can model the threats and attacks. Specifically,
we can collect security information from the networks, we
can identify potential attack plans in the network, generate
specific attack plan using well-defined planning strategies
and execute attack actions and generate reports. However,
we have not evaluated the proposed framework to under-
stand the performance in other scenarios. In the future, we
plan to evaluate the framework using different deployment
scenarios.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed an automation framework
to model cyber-threats and attacks strategies in order to
assess the security of real systems. We have developed a
set of deterministic planning strategies using a Graphical
Security Model to plan an attacker’s course of actions in
a networked system. Besides, we have developed detailed
algorithms to automate the proposed attack planning strate-
gies. We performed experiments on real network and AWS
networks to demonstrate the usage of the proposed au-
tomation framework. Hence, this paper developed a new
automation framework that supports the modeling of the
red team operations, as well provides a security assessment
tool for cyber-defenses.
This section provides appendices. Figure 9 shows the
visualization for the upper layer HARM tool (of the network
model). Figure 10 shows the the visualization for lower layer
HARM using ATs, and Figure 11 shows the report generated
based on HARM.
Fig. 9. A screenshot of the HARM- Upper layer
Fig. 10. A screenshot of the HARM- Lower layer
Fig. 11. A screenshot of the HARM- Report
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